Winston Churchill Argued That The Munich Agreement Would Quizlet

The Munich Agreement was a treaty between Nazi Germany and France. The following option, which best describes the consequences of the 1938 Munich Agreement, is that, prior to their departure from Munich, Chamberlain and Hitler signed a document in which they declared their common wish to settle disputes through consultations aimed at securing peace. Daladier and Chamberlain both returned home to welcome enthusiastic and acclaimed people, relieved that the danger of war had passed, and Chamberlain told the British public that he had “achieved peace with honour.” I believe that this is peace for our time. His words were immediately scorned by his greatest critic, Winston Churchill, who declared: “They had a choice between war and dishonour. You chose the dispossessions, and you`ll go to war. Indeed, Chamberlain`s policy was discredited the following year, when Hitler annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia in March, and then triggered World War II with the invasion of Poland in September. The Munich Agreement became synonymous with the futility of appeasement of the expansionist totalitarian states, although it bought time for the Allies to increase their military will. When Hitler continued to make incendiary speeches calling for the reunification of the Germans in Czechoslovakia with their homeland, war seemed imminent. But neither France nor Britain felt ready to defend Czechoslovakia and they both tried to avoid a military confrontation with Germany at all costs. In France, the popular Front government had ended and on 8 April 1938, Edouard Daladier formed a new cabinet without socialist participation or communist support. Four days later, Le Temps, whose foreign policy was controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published an article by Joseph Barthelemy, a professor at the Paris School of Law, in which he examined the 1924 Franco-Czechoslovakian Treaty of Alliance and concluded that France was not obliged to go to war to save Czechoslovakia. Earlier, on 22 March, the Times of London had stated in an editorial by its publisher G.G. Dawson that Britain could not wage war to preserve Czech sovereignty over the Sudeten Germans without anticipating its wishes; Otherwise, “Britain may well fight against the principle of self-determination.” On 22 September Chamberlain flew again to Germany and met Hitler in Bad Godesberg, where he learned with dismay that Hitler had exacerbated his demands: he now wanted the Sudetenland to be occupied by the German army and for the Czechoslovaks to be evacuated from the area by 28 September.

Chamberlain agreed to submit the new proposal to the Czechoslovaks, who rejected it, as did the British cabinet and the French. On the 24th, the French ordered a partial mobilization; The day before, the Czechoslovakians had ordered a general mobilization. Since Czechoslovakia was one of the best equipped armies in the world at that time, it was able to mobilize 47 divisions, 37 of which were for the German border, and the most mountainous line at that border was strongly defined. On the German side, the final version of “Case Green”, as approved by Hitler on 30 May, showed 39 divisions for operations against Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks were ready to fight, but they could not win alone.